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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Senior Research Staff on International Communism

A NEW PROGRAM FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM:

The Statement of the Moscow Conference of Representatives
of Communist and Workers Parties (December 1960)

CIA/SRS-15



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This paper is based on information
available to SRS as of 13 February
1961

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FOREWORD

This study was completed before the "revelation" (12 February 1961) of the highly controversial proceedings of the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers Parties (November-December 1960). Whatever the inspiration of the "leakage" of this information, it has had two beneficial effects: (1) it has permitted a partial downgrading of classification on the intelligence discussion of the meeting, and (2) has sharply focussed the issues of Free World and US attitude and policy toward the Sino-Soviet alliance and International Communism.

This paper, although buttressed in a comprehensive study of available information, is deliberately speculative in approach. It attempts to look at the Moscow Statement primarily "through communist eyes." This effort has led to certain conclusions which are not optimistic in nature. Specifically, we question, more strongly than ever, the widely held belief that there exists an antagonistic "rift" or "split" within the Communist movement which can readily be deepened through divisive activity on our part. This is not a "defeatist" attitude so much as a counsel of prudence and deliberation. Our message is simple: let all persons responsible in any way for the security of the Free World and the United States, study and re-study the Statement itself, carefully, clinically and without inclination to either hopes or fears.

The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the Senior Research Staff on International Communism. They have not been coordinated with other elements of the Central Intelligence Agency or of the Government. They are not to be interpreted as the official views of the Director of Central Intelligence.

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A NEW PROGRAM FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM:
The Statement of the Moscow Conference of Representatives
of Communist and Workers Parties (December 1960)

PART I

Introduction

This paper attempts to present in speculative discourse an interpretation of the developments in the Sino-Soviet relation leading up to the issuance of the Statement of the Moscow Conference of Workers and Communist Parties (November-December 1960), and to project the global impact of that document. It takes its start in the general body of earlier Western analysis, and further seeks, by utilizing newly available material, and by providing a supplemental "view through communist eyes," to create a perspective in which the forest predominates over the trees.

The paper is divided into two sections, the first dealing with the antecedents of the Statement, the second with its significance for the future of International Communism as a movement.

The general contention of this paper, that communist unity has been strengthened rather than weakened, may be reduced to a few propositions:

(1) Prior to "The Moscow Statement" the Sino-Soviet relation had been marked by mounting controversy, coinciding roughly with the period of ascendancy of Khrushchev, (i.e. since early 1956);

(2) This controversy has been serious, but not, in the outcome, dangerously divisive; it has centered in what the communists call "differences" and in some cases "contradictions." The effort of the parties at the Moscow Conference was to resolve these, if possible, by "fraternal criticism and

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self-criticism," and in any case to prevent them from becoming "antagonistic."

(3) The great bulk of the points of controversy have not been of a fundamental ideological or strategic nature; they have not involved the ultimate goals of the movement. Rather they have been matters of emphasis or interpretation, of methods and tactics, and in the last analysis, frequently of towering personality conflict.

(4) The Statement which emerged marks a real turning point in the history of the movement constituting a general program - the first since early Comintern days - within which individual parties, greater and less, can develop their particular programs, suited to their specific opportunities and circumstances.

(5) As a result of the confrontation of the two senior parties sparring in "contradiction" in the presence of some 80 lesser parties, the movement has entered a new phase of organization and discipline, in which there is no longer a single "leader" or "center," at most a "vanguard." What appears to be emerging as an expansion of the "world socialist system" (the 12 members of the Sino-Soviet bloc) is a sodruzhestvo (commonwealth or community) of socialist nations, as yet without organizational form, but pregnant with such.

(6) Although some of the earlier differences and contradictions will persist and new ones will arise, the entire exercise - from the Communist viewpoint - has been a successful demonstration of Mao's cardinal operating principle: unity-criticism-unity. As such it will, in our judgment, usher the movement into a period of greater confidence, flexibility and power, and will heighten the threat posed to the Free World.

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I. Antecedents of The Moscow Statement

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One may question at the outset whether any of the participants, including the CPSU itself, expected that the general proceedings could be kept entirely secret from the West. With such a large number of delegates from virtually every country of the world, it was inevitable that security would sooner or later be broken. In this sense the situation may be somewhat comparable to the leakage of the secret report of Khrushchev to the 20th Party Congress, February 1956 - the notorious de-Stalinization speech. The delivery of that speech was surrounded with considerable security, but, in the process of propagandizing it throughout the party ranks of the USSR and the key satellites, it must have been anticipated that sooner or later the West would get hold of it. This indirect form of leakage may perhaps be described as a deliberate taking advantage of the realities of Communist security limitations to enhance the dramatic impact of an epoch-making event.

The first and most striking conclusion which the available material suggests is that the November meeting, and the preparatory commission's deliberations in October, were in


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fact the culmination of a sharp and even bitter Sino-Soviet controversy. In this sense the new material confirms the validity of much of the Western analysis of the preceding months. This analysis which had been based largely on semi-esoteric "indications" provided by published Communist material had succeeded in isolating a number of themes which were being antithetically treated by the two senior partners of the movement. With very few exceptions these antitheses were conspicuous in the October and November meetings. The new material therefore constitutes a further proof of the value of "indications" analysis. At the same time, however, as we shall attempt to demonstrate in the second section of this paper, the limitations of this type of analysis have also become more apparent. For, beneath the surface manifestations of the controversy, lie certain deeper issues involving the unity and future dynamics of the world movement which have now emerged, we believe, in a light quite different from that projected upon them by much of the earlier commentary.

It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss in detail the information which we now have on the speeches and discussions of the two meetings. These deserve continued and profound research. We propose here to draw only a few tentative conclusions which will serve in laying the foundation for the principal thesis presented in the second part of this paper.

By now it has become clear that the controversy between the CPSU and the CPC was generally coeval with the rule of Khrushchev, i. e. it emerged during the "crisis" of 1956, the de-Stalinization, Poland and Hungary - and the "stabilization" process of early 1957. The fact that the CPC leaders, especially Mao Tse-tung, had personally come to the rescue of the

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CPSU, especially between December 1956 and the spring of 1957, now stands forth clearly as a major source of ill-feeling. Mao's two famous statements, "More on the Historical Dictatorship of the Proletariat" and "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions," struck some Western observers at the time as containing the seeds of potential animosity. The rather olympian and apodictic tone of these articles must have struck the CPSU leaders as, to say the least, highly condescending: "This is how it's done, boys!" They were probably all the more galling, because in fact they did contribute effectively to bailing out Khrushchev.

At the same time the very success of these pronouncements may also have contributed to the rapid inflation of Mao's already far from insubstantial ego and to the crescendo development of his "cult of personality" which reached its climax with the 10th Anniversary of the Chinese revolution, Peking, October 1959.¹ The subsequent heavy stress in Communist China on study of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" led to one of the sharpest notes of criticism in the October and November 1960 meetings. The Chinese were accused by the Soviet spokesmen, and to some extent by other party leaders, of attempting to "Sinicize" Marxism-Leninism. This in turn was associated with "dogmatic-sectarian" deviation and with a "divorce" from reality, the masses, and "life", a charge which was bitterly resented by the Chinese delegates and of course by Mao himself.²

¹ Cf. SRS-12, "The Tenth Anniversary Celebration of the People's Republic of China" 1 September 1959.

² One of the more interesting revelations of the new material is the fact that Mao, at the Moscow conference of November 1957, admitted to a certain degree of illness which his doctors had diagnosed as "brain anemia." Whatever this malady may have been, there is no definite evidence to bear out the conjectures of some Western analysts that it is of a paranoid or incapacitating severity - still less that it has led the CPC to put Mao in effect into cotton batting, i.e. withdrawing real power

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The Chinese in both the preparatory and the full meetings of course denied categorically the adverse imputations of Sinicization. They claimed that they have stood firmly on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and that the genius of Mao lay in his adaptation of these universal precepts to the specific conditions of China. They professed that the lessons of their experience could be of value to other parties in comparable situations - a claim which the CPSU could hardly deny - but they did not attempt to put theirs ahead of the richer and more varied experience of the senior party.

This matter of personal sensitivity of the two top leaders breaks out repeatedly in the reports of the proceedings. Mao, of course, appears only vicariously through his dogged mouthpiece, Teng Hsiao-ping. But the resentful and at times even petulant voice of the latter must have echoed the somber jealousies of his chief, "sulking in his tent" back in China. Khrushchev on the other hand was "in there pitching," with a near "shoe-pounding" vigor. He made at least three important speeches, combining a general tone of conciliation and reasonableness with ill-concealed undertones of vexation and pique and occasional righteous indignation. During the preparatory meeting, from which Khrushchev was absent - being at the UN - a phalanx of senior CPSU leaders headed by Comrade Suslov appeared to be trying to intimidate, if not overpower, Comrade Teng. One is left with the impression that this was a situation to which the Soviet leaders were unaccustomed, the persistent refusal of a wayward but embattled comrade to be browbeaten, cajoled, or simply out-talked by the voice of established authority.

from him while exaggerating his role as father-demigod of the revolution. It may turn out that this interpretation is indeed partly correct, but so far there is abundant testimony that Mao not only is active but is fully in command of the Chinese party.

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A striking feature of the continuing controversy was the inflammatory effect of an exchange of disputatious letters between the two parties obviously addressed not so much to each other as to an attendant clique of lesser parties. This series of provocation and counterprovocation can now be reconstructed with considerable precision, and it conforms rather closely to the theses derived from open material by earlier Western analysis. The 82-page letter circulated by the CPSU at Bucharest, the September 10 letter of the CPC, and the November 4 counter-rebuttal letter of the CPSU distributed to the delegates at the Moscow conference are the high points in this thicket of mutual recrimination.

For the purpose of the present analysis, it is the last of these three documents which presents the most serious problem. The deliberations of the preparatory commission, though sharp and even acrimonious, had in fact ended in a general acceptance by the CPC of the draft submitted by the CPSU, subject to reservations which would be aired before the full conference. It would have seemed, therefore, that the Chinese had displayed sufficient conciliatory spirit and willingness to make concessions so that the CPSU might have been satisfied to let the conference take its normal course. Instead, however, it circulated the November 4 letter to the delegates at the beginning of the conference, thereby guaranteeing a new flareup of all the angry themes which had been damped in October.

The question arises, why was this renewal of controversy precipitated by the CPSU? Possibly Khrushchev felt that so many of the basic issues remained unresolved despite surface accommodation by the Chinese that it was better to bring them out in the open before the plenary session of the movement. He may also have believed that the radical, bellicose and impetuous nature of the CPC and the CPR had to be demonstrated before all the brethren in order to show the gravity

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of the contradiction with the CPSU. Be that as it may, the act of circulating this letter certainly contributed to the prolonged forensics of the November conference, a fact which the Chinese peevishly pointed out.

One of the most striking conclusions which emerges from the speeches of the November meeting is that the points at issue, whatever they may have been at earlier stages, were not of a fundamental ideological, or strategic nature, so far as the movement was concerned. The broad themes of the Statement, dealing with the character and nature of the epoch, the aggressive nature of imperialism, the "non-inevitability" of war, and the dual possibility of violent and non-violent transition to socialism, had virtually been reduced to accepted formulas. The points at issue between the Chinese and the Soviet parties had come, therefore, to be primarily matters of emphasis, and as such they should have been susceptible of either immediate or longer term resolution. In other words, the potentially "antagonistic contradictions" had largely been removed and what remained were either limited "non-antagonistic" contradictions or at a still lower level, differences.¹

The Soviet and Chinese theories on contradictions are both derived of course from Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism but their practical development has followed somewhat divergent courses. It is rather noteworthy that in the texts which we have of the conference speeches, the emphasis throughout is on differences rather than contradictions. Khrushchev,

¹ The Russian distinction between protivorechie (contradiction) and raznitza or razlichie (difference) is paralleled in Chinese by the terms mao tun and ch'a pieh. Chou En-lai, in his interview with Edgar Snow (Look Magazine, January 31, 1961) said that the latter term should be translated as "dissimilarity." It would be more accurate to define ch'a pieh as difference: in degree or in this case in approach; not in kind or in this case in the fundamentals; comparison rather than contrast; certainly contradiction is not suggested.

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however, in his final speech admits that contradictions will persist even among Socialist states, apparently an important, and from the Chinese point of view overdue, acceptance of one of Mao's cardinal principles - the universality of contradictions even under socialism.¹

If, then, the fundamental issues had been generally resolved - or at least "put on ice" - what were the contradictions or differences that persisted during the discussions, and were deplored as threatening unity? On the surface they had to do almost entirely with matters of discipline in the movement and the conduct of relations among the parties. Specifically the Chinese were opposed to passages in the draft declaration bearing on (1) factionalism, (2) national communism, and (3) the universal significance for the movement of the 20th and 21st Congresses of the CPSU. In the discussion of these points the Chinese delegates several times resorted to a term which Mao had used admonishingly in December 1956, "great nation chauvinism," specifically Russian, which implied exclusive or monopolistic predominance of the CPSU in the movement.

Outwardly the tension of charge and counter-charge was somewhat relieved by a curious "Gaston-Alphonse" act between the CPSU and the CPC over the titular aspect of the former's position, i.e. whether it was the "leader of the camp" or the "center of the movement" or both.

The byplay of this delicate piece of communist semantics and etiquette had been noticeable for some time. As far back

¹ We are preparing a closer analysis of this aspect of the current dialectic; we believe that the topic is not a matter of communist jargon or logic-chopping but is of fundamental importance for understanding the Sino-Soviet relationship.

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as the 10th Anniversary celebration in Peking (October 1959) the Chinese had dropped the ritualistic reference to the CPSU as the "center of the movement" while retaining its "leadership of the socialist camp." This significant emendation may have contributed to Khrushchev's decision at the 21st Party Congress (January 1960) to deny the general responsibility of the CPSU for, and to proclaim the absolute equality and independence of, the separate member parties.¹ In all of his three speeches Khrushchev spiritedly (and on occasion in unprintable language) refused the proffered leadership. Any pre-eminence which the CPSU might enjoy, he sanctimoniously affirmed, should be attributed solely to its rich experience and its good work in inspiring, aiding and defending the "world socialist system" and the other components of the movement. The Chinese on the other hand persisted in according a formally deferential role of both leadership to the USSR and centrality to the CPSU. In part this may reflect the old Chinese tradition of veneration for the elder members of the family,² applied here to the "big socialist family" or sodruzhestvo. If so, however, Khrushchev would have none of it. In scurrilous language, he blasted such profession of father-son relationship as misleading if not deceitful, a device to put the blame on the CPSU whenever things went wrong.³

¹ This in turn may have been influenced by the promulgation of the so-called Herter doctrine, holding the USSR responsible in part for the foreign activities of the lesser Communist states. Part of the difficulty in the Herter doctrine lies in its failure to distinguish between the Party and the State aspects of Soviet influence and control. At any rate, the doctrine appears to have been short-lived, though it may have accomplished something - not necessarily to our interest - by focussing the issue of Soviet hegemony within the movement.

² See below, page 24.

³ The Chinese representative also reacted against the father-son analogy but on different grounds.

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The long-range significance of this dialogue on leadership and centrality will be discussed in the second section of this paper. It is sufficient to note here that it was a conspicuous aspect of the "comradely" exchanges of the meeting.

Closely related, and recurrent in the Chinese speeches, is the charge that the CPSU had sought to "stifle criticism" and had avoided the fraternal consultation which Lenin prescribed for Marxist parties. The exchanges on this subject frequently degenerated into a "who struck John?" type of bickering which must have offended the sense of dignity of many of the observers and participants among the other parties. And yet, taken as a whole, one may judge that the entire exercise was in their eyes a demonstration of "comradely criticism." That it grated harshly on communist ears, as a fortiori it does on ours, does not invalidate its authenticity. One can even imagine that behind the scenes many of the delegates must have rubbed their hands after particularly juicy bouts, gloating over the liveliest demonstration of communist forensics since the golden days of the Comintern. The fact that the Albanian leader, Enver Hoxha, was particularly waspish, even childish at times, greatly annoyed the Soviet leaders and perhaps even the Chinese themselves who must have been dismayed to have a protégé behave so obstreperously. But by its very reductio ad absurdum the Albanian tirade may have reinforced the Chinese contention that hard hitting criticism is vital to the movement.

These are some of the impressions which emerge from the reports on the course of the debate down to 23 November. Here, however, we move abruptly from the known to the unknown. Having, in effect, agreed to agree on fundamentals and to disagree on secondary although burning differences, the Chinese and the Russian parties adjourned into secret huddle, apparently of several days duration. There is some evidence that the other parties had urged them to do this in the hope of restoring basic unity, and that the combined pressure of the Conference of Communist and Workers' parties

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had to be taken into consideration. Whether in fact the two big brothers had to have their arms severely twisted before retiring into tête-à-tête may be doubted. In fact, a suspicious mind might detect a rather deliberately manipulative course of mounting acrimony, intended, incidentally if not primarily, to dramatize the dénouement of unity.

What really happened during this inner conclave, we may never know. Possibly there were important "deals," such as resumption of normal technological or economic assistance by the USSR, or agreement by the Chinese to "lay off" while Khrushchev gave US negotiations a "whirl." Possibly there was an exchange of cables between Liu Shao-chi - hitherto silent while Comrade Teng carried the brunt of the attack - and Mao Tse-tung. Mao may have concluded that he had made his points, that comradely criticism had gone far enough, and that now was the time to revert to the classic quietus of unity. Be this as it may, the spectacle of Liu Shao-chi blandly and benignly reappearing before the conference, and assuring the hundreds of delegates that China was satisfied with the Statement in toto and that unity was stronger than ever, must have made a real deus ex machina impact.

Looking back, however, over this speculative analysis, which does seem to account for many of the known facts, we are left still with a haunting question: What was it all about? Was this criticism really necessary?

If we assume that it takes two to make a quarrel, both the Chinese and the Russians must for some time have harbored serious misgivings about each other's general conduct.


Quite possibly the real roots of these apprehensions were not revealed at all in the open disputation. One may conjecture that what bothered the Chinese was the broad drift of the CPSU under Khrushchev away from the true dynamics of revolution. The charge that Khrushchev's visit to the

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United States and his praise of Eisenhower as a man of peace had "prettified" and "embellished" imperialism may come close to revealing the depths of their passionately expressed criticism. A note of human anger strikes through the cold discourse of Teng Hsiao-ping on this subject - a sort of "how could you, of all people, do anything like this?"

On the other hand, Khrushchev probably harbored a sincere and profound conviction that the Chinese were alarmingly "dizzy with success" as revolutionists. Whether he had regarded such episodes as the 1958 attack on Quemoy as adventuristic or had been sincerely outraged by the Indian border fracas, we do not know. But there is enough evidence in the tenor of his speeches to suggest that Khrushchev genuinely believed that the Chinese were prone to act with dangerous irresponsibility. In a very significant passage from a speech which he delivered at a ceremonial dinner for the members of the preparatory commission after their work was completed (October 22) Khrushchev spoke earnestly of his profound study of Marx, Engels, Bebel and Liebknecht - no reference to Lenin or Stalin - which had convinced him that the doctrine of Communism is essentially moral. As such, it cannot envisage war, with its destruction and inhumanity, as an acceptable means of bringing about the triumph of socialism. If we assume that Khrushchev was speaking from one of the deeper levels of Communist consciousness - and as Dedijer has pointed out, there are several levels, sometimes,

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in gross contradiction - he may well have been giving voice to a burning conviction that the Chinese were wanton, if not potentially criminal, in their attitude toward nuclear war. This emotional position, perhaps a remnant of his childhood religion, would not, however, dominate his overall strategy nor soften his Communist consciousness if any opportunity should arise to "strike a blow" at imperialism without running too severe a risk.

This is a very difficult matter to analyze and had perhaps best be held in abeyance pending further evidence. One of the important insights provided by the new material concerns the famous remark attributed to Mao that in the event of total war, 300 million Chinese would survive and that a new and more beautiful socialist society would emerge. The reported text of what he said at Moscow in November 1957 places this theme in a different and somewhat less Armageddon type of light. What Mao actually appears to have said was that world atomic war would be indeed horrible but that communists had to face the fact that the imperialists might nevertheless launch it. If they should, and even if half the population of the world were killed, well over a billion would survive - i.e. not merely 300 million Chinese - and eventually they would reconstruct a new socialist system, free from imperialism, better and more beautiful than before. This is hardly the fire-eating concept frequently attributed to him. In point of fact it closely parallels the orthodox view of the USSR, prior to its achievement of full nuclear capability.

In sum, we are not inclined to believe that the Chinese really think that the Russians have "gone soft" on imperialism,

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promoting "peace at any price," and weakening the resistance of the masses by their talk of "peaceful coexistence." On the other hand, the CPSU and Khrushchev, while subjectively alarmed by such colorful phrases as "paper tiger" - explained away by Teng Hsiao-ping as a parable from classic Chinese literature - probably do not objectively regard the Chinese as incurable "adventurists." Mao had clearly stated that China needed 15 years of peace, as did the Soviet Union and the rest of the "world socialist system." There is no reason that the CPSU - any more than we - should believe that Mao would actively incur - let alone welcome - a nuclear holocaust.

If in the last analysis the CPSU and the CPC understand each other's views on the world situation, and while criticizing each other are still in basic unity, can the same be said with regard to their internal development? Here too the controversy may have been sharper beneath the surface and at the same time more susceptible of resolution than Western analysis has supposed. In view of the greatly differing stages of development and historic backgrounds of the two economies, it would not be surprising if differences verging on contradictions had indeed arisen between the two parties. Khrushchev had made it clear that he did not like the impetuosity with which the communes and the "great leap forward" were launched. Whether officially and at the highest level of party councils the CPSU had expressed serious criticism to its Chinese brethren, warning against the danger of actual collapse of the economy, we do not know. But Marxist-Leninist theory and practice both prescribe a certain measure of laissez-faire; the CPC and the CPR have the right to adapt their plans to specific Chinese conditions as they see them. The Soviet leaders may criticize in a "fraternal" spirit, but in the last analysis it is not they who decide what is best for China.

Reversing the picture, the Chinese unquestionably must be resentful and mistrustful of mounting "bourgeois" tendencies which they note in the Soviet society. The almost unseemly haste with which, following the visits of Mikoyan, Kozlov,

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and Khrushchev, the Central Committee of the CPSU issued a series of decrees virtually laying down the blueprint for an American system of benefits for the masses, must have been galling to the leaders of communist China, still in the throes of privation and primitive consumer gratification.¹ The arguments over building a "mighty material base" for the "transition to Communism" and for maintaining the motive of individual incentive during the transition must have seemed to the Chinese like rationalization or "embellishment" of capitalist economic methods. They must have resented being chided on their own "heroic" efforts, such as the wasteful backyard steel mills, by a brother party which had graduated after three decades of Stalinesque austerity into a relative American type of affluence, with all its enervating consequences.

Finally, the Chinese may have seen behind this "prettification" of capitalist economic methods an even more sinister danger of general "bourgeoisification," centering in the widely touted program of the CPSU to create a "socialist humanism." Here in the field of social conditioning may lie the most deep-rooted of all the actual or potential contradictions between the CPC and the CPSU. China inherits a four thousand year old tradition which is being simultaneously uprooted and adapted to the construction of socialism. It has its own balance of individualist and collectivist elements and principles. The Soviet Union, especially in its European Slavic parts, has a much shallower tradition, heavily derivative from Western

¹ In particular a CPSU Central Committee decree of January 1960 must have been truly shocking to the Chinese: it laid down a program for massive expansion of production of such frills as frozen fruit juices, prepared cereals - sugar-coated y distributed through super-markets or by home delivery, with television advertising. The acme of "bourgeois" complacency must have been the claim that this program could be financed by the savings from the demobilization of a third of the Soviet armed forces (these savings incidentally appear to have been over-hypothesized for more than one "noble" cause).

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Europe. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Chinese Communist leaders should look upon their Soviet counterparts as upstarts, lacking in that "high seriousness" of purpose which the challenge of history demands.

We may conclude that there was quite enough in the unspoken background of the Moscow meeting to have accounted for its note of acrimony. How much these issues were ventilated behind the scenes, to what extent this tissue of differences and contradictions was put in order, we do not know. We can only proceed on the basis of what emerged, the Statement itself, and the program which it announces.

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PART II

The Moscow Statement: A New Program for
International Communism

The Moscow Statement is being hailed as "of world historic importance, representing a single common platform of the entire communist movement, and the ideological foundation for its further rallying and fresh successes . . . A remarkable program of action for the whole international communist movement for many years to come . . . the documents will raise the international workers to a new level and give a fresh, powerful impetus to the national liberation movement, as well as to the peoples to avert war, to insure a lasting peace on earth." The words are those of Mikhail Suslov¹ but they are being faithfully echoed by all of the 87 communist parties throughout the world.

In the West, the prevailing evaluation is antithetical. The Declaration is viewed as a "hodge podge of contradictions," a "scissors and paste job," a "papering over of cracks in the monolith," a tissue of concessions and counter-concessions between Communist China and the USSR (box-scoremanship about even!), a "nominal" rather than a "genuine" reconciliation, a document from which each and every faction can quote what it wants, a mere "facade of unity," a stimulus rather than a restraint to forces of disunity within the Bloc.

Can these antitheses be synthesized?

We may state at the outset our judgment - intuitive rather than demonstrable - that Western analysis has been influenced by a subjective tendency to underrate the forces

¹ Report to the Plenum of the CPSU, Moscow, 18 January, FBIS, 23 January 1961, p. CC 6.

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working for unity in the movement, and to see in the sharp discussion evidence of a polarization and antagonism, which, between Western allies, would seem surely to portend a break. The analysis has not contended that a break of Tito-like proportions, i.e. on the Party but not the State level - was inevitable, but rather has predicted a "rocking along" course for the Moscow-Peking axis, plagued with deepening difficulties and conflicts, but somehow held together by fear of the consequences of a decisive split.

On the other side, we may affirm that the Communists have displayed their own form of subjectivism in continuing to proclaim on faith that history is on their side, with the corollary that the Moscow Statement is a secular revelation of "life itself." They may or may not have erred objectively in their estimate of the character of the era as one "whose main content is the transition from capitalism to socialism initiated by the Great October Revolution . . . a time of struggle between the two opposing social systems, a time of socialist revolutions and national liberation revolutions, of the breakdown of imperialism, of the abolition of the colonial system, a time of transition of more peoples to the socialist path, of the triumph of socialism and communism on a worldwide scale." The test of the validity of this estimate lies with us as much as with them.

In attempting a synthesis, let us assume that what we are dealing with does, in fact, as the communists proclaim, constitute a new Program. As such it would be the first and only general program of the movement, at least since the early days of the Comintern. It stands to reason that such a program, clearly stated to be applicable in essentials to all parties of the movement, could not have sprung forth, full-blown from the brow of that latter day Zeus, Marxism-Leninism. Rather it had to be elaborated in heat and travail, patiently with trial and much error, over a considerable expanse of time and space.

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It is difficult to decide when this process emerged from a mere Sturm und Drang of the movement into a conscious drive toward a goal.

In an effort to place the Moscow Conference in its historic perspective one may begin with the Second World War, distinguishing - somewhat arbitrarily - the following phases or landmarks in the development of International Communism:

1943 - Dissolution of the Comintern, marking the end of that interpretation of "proletarian internationalism" which emphasized monopolistic allegiance to the "fatherland of the Socialist Revolution," the Soviet Union. By this symbolic act, emerging from the isolation of "socialism in one country," Stalin bought needed transitory reassurance for his wartime allies, and opened the way for the postwar expansion of the Soviet imperium and the international communist movement, while leaving in abeyance the question of the latter's future organization. Conditions of worldwide belligerency had made communications among the parties extremely difficult; not much would actually be lost by giving up the Comintern for the time being; after the war, a new situation would arise calling for a different method of Communist organization.

1945-48 - Satellitization of Eastern Europe under the wing of the Red Army. This period marked the emergence of the "world socialist system," not yet rounded out by the addition of Communist China. This full-blown, later Stalinism, a coercive method of rule coupled with absolute polarization of two world systems (exclusion of neutrals) may be regarded as a carryover of the "Sovietocentric" practice of the Comintern. The more pallid influence of its successor, the Cominform, reflected the continuing requirement for an international co-ordinating and indoctrinating center for communist parties outside the confines of the "world socialist system," especially the French and Italian CPs which, having emerged from the

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war period as mass organizations, faced difficult tactical situations.

1948 - The Yugoslav Crisis and the expulsion of Tito from the Cominform showed the limits beyond which Stalinist control could not be pushed, and established a center of objective power for "national communism" and "revisionism," and an alternative model of foreign and domestic policy for socialist states.

1949 - The triumph of Communism in mainland China (with ensuing satellitization of North Korea and North Vietnam) established the boundaries of the "world socialist system" for the 1950s, consolidating the northern half of the Eurasian mainland as the base for future expansion. On the state side, the Sino-Soviet alliance established the foundations for the long-range political and economic drive to power of the "socialist camp." The achievement by the USSR of a nuclear capability radically altered the balance of military power, and ushered in the era of "mutual deterrence by terror."

1953-57 - The death of Stalin released a jam of new forces which had been piling up within the USSR and the "system" during his later years. It is not sufficient to characterize the post-Stalin actions merely as a negation of his policies, as a sudden access of "flexibility" after his "rigidity." Rather the entire complex period must be regarded as one of intense historic evolution within the framework of inherited Marxist-Leninist ideology, the combination of "theory and practice." During these four years, the central focus within the Soviet Union lay in the struggle for consolidation of the succession, resolved in July 1957. Elsewhere in the "system" it lay in a series of attendant crises resulting from the process of de-Stalinization (February 1956) and the liberalization of the mechanisms of control in the satellites (Poland and Hungary). These were reflected by a general crisis among the Free World parties. As we have noted above, the process of "stabilization"

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had begun in the last months of 1956, and was powerfully assisted and influenced in its outcome by Communist China. This intervention marked the coming of age of another colossus - foreshadowed by its "victory" in the Korean War - and established Mao as the only living personal exemplar of continuous, successful socialist revolution.

November 1957 - The Moscow Conference of the Communist and Workers' Parties in celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the October Revolution was at once the triumphal manifestation of stabilization in the USSR, and the first ecumenical council of the "world socialist system" and the international movement. As such it was regarded by Communists as the greatest landmark since the Bolshevik Revolution.

The significance of the 1957 Declaration of the 12 nations of the "world socialist system" and the Peace Appeal of the 64 attending communist parties, was profoundly enhanced by the launching of the first Sputnik (October 7). From then on, the balance of world power has been held by the communists to be shifting "decisively" in favor of the "socialist camp."

If one asks what is the essential nature of the three-year period between the two Moscow conclaves, two answers are at hand. One is the basic Western analysis, mentioned above, which may be recapitulated as follows: during this period the Sino-Soviet relation increasingly displayed the characteristics of a classic 19th century type of alliance of national states with divergent interests - power, control, security, empire - which came into heightened and finally acute conflict. Under a mantle of "ideological" controversy ("revisionism" versus "dogmatism,") the two super powers of the alliance, flanked by lesser factions, moved in the direction of an interim showdown. Recognizing the danger of a complete break, the senior partners sought by lobbying among the junior partners first to enlist their support, and then to achieve a compromise which would keep the movement

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intact, postponing a still more decisive showdown. The basic issues remain unresolved, and the prospect is for further sharp conflict, damaging to the monolithic unity of the movement.

The essential point of this analysis is that it proceeds from Western patterns of thought, broadly speaking, traditional in content and optimistic in outlook. It concludes that the USSR, China, and their satellites react very much as other nation states have in past - and present - alliances. They will not be able to conduct their internal adjustments without disruptive consequences. In other words, we can reckon hopefully with the prospect that International Communism will become increasingly ineffective as a power grouping, and may - the accent is on probability - decline as a threat to the West.

The other answer, as we have noted above, is the Communist one. What has been taking place is an intense stage in the forward thrust of the movement. "Contradictions" have arisen, as, according to life, history and Marx, they must. Opposites are in conflict. But the movement, armed with Marxist-Leninist dialectic, has conducted a massive operation of scientific analysis, of criticism and self-criticism, from which it has emerged strengthened, and confident, with many, though not all, contradictions resolved, with a new program and with an ever brighter outlook.

In our search for a synthesis, we would turn the spotlight on the central problem: the organization and discipline of International Communism as a movement. As we have noted in Part I, most of what has been brought into the foreground as "ideological" controversy - "inevitability of war," "peaceful coexistence," attitudes toward "imperialism" and the "national liberation" movement - is in fact largely a matter of tactical emphasis within a broadly agreed strategy. Behind it looms the vast issue, how is the "world socialist system" -

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the 12 nation-states constituting the Sino-Soviet Bloc - to become the matrix of integral World Communism? How can such a movement grow and triumph, unless it has a single center, a single head? In our judgment, the absorbing, passionate debate - and it has been one - within the movement has led to a provisional, not a permanent answer to these burning questions. The answer is, however, not one from which we should derive much reassurance.

[REDACTED] we called attention to the significance of the term sodruzhestvo, frequently used in Soviet statements on the relations between socialist countries. Translated as "commonwealth," or "community" this concept of association in friendship is one basic element of a triad, of which the other two are - "socialist camp" and "world socialist system." Since 1955 a long series of references, and above all the 1960 Moscow Statement, show that these three elements are not merely interconnected, they are, under differing aspects, one and the same thing. The "system" refers to the homogeneity of state, party and society among the component members; the "camp" expresses their militant solidarity in defense and offense; the sodruzhestvo connotes their independence, equality and practice of mutual assistance.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

We further advanced the speculation that the concept of sodruzhestvo contained in itself the seeds of organizational form which might lead to the development of new institutions, procedures and relationships going far beyond those of the existing Sino-Soviet Bloc. We ventured the conjecture that steps would be taken in the not too distant future to actualize the potential of this concept. We suggested that a sort of counter-UN might emerge. At the same time, we recognized that the divergences of China and the USSR - especially the

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seeming reluctance of the Chinese to accept the term "commonwealth," preferring in its stead the looser image of the "big family" - might lead to the development of a sort of dual sodruzhestvo, analogous, within the "secular religion" of communism, to the Eastern and Western Christian churches, and eventually to a Protestant Reformation. We held such a development as less likely, however, than the preservation of a unitary movement.

It appears to us of great significance that the Moscow Statement, and subsequent reinforcing utterances, especially Khrushchev's speech of 6 January 1961, and Suslov's Report to the Central Committee, dated 18 January, explicitly maintain the equation: system-camp-sodruzhestvo.¹ Any effort to analyze the Moscow Conference as a landmark in the development of international communism must, therefore, clearly take account of the sodruzhestvo.

What then is its significance?

In our judgment, the Moscow proceedings must be viewed as the second ecumenical council of the secular world religion of International Communism, the conference of November 1957 being the first. Because of size (87 as opposed to 64 parties represented), duration (four weeks instead of one)

¹ It is perhaps significant that official Soviet English language translations no longer use the word "commonwealth," substituting the less historically charged term "community." Possibly this is a concession to Chinese or even to Free World Party sensibilities, mistrustful of the connotations of any term recalling the British Commonwealth. At any rate, the Chinese version of the Moscow statement, which is generally very precise and seems to have equal status with the Russian text, still uses the earlier translation ta chia t'ing, "big family." The term is used four times in the Statement, and clearly is authoritative. We shall continue to translate it as "commonwealth."

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and significance of agenda, the second meeting is clearly more important than the first.

We have suggested that Western analysis has tended to view the 1960 gathering as a crisis in an essentially polarized situation, a showdown forced on the Russians by the intransigence of the Chinese. In this analysis, the presence of the 79 other parties is of secondary or even minor importance. We do not believe that this interpretation does justice to the occasion. This was a world encounter, the greater and the lesser of the Communist parties, gathered, not to be manipulated by two quarreling senior brothers, but to participate in a solemn creative action, the formulation of a new program for international communism.

It is in this positive light that we should view not only the Conference itself but its antecedents, the long Byzantine discourse and intrigue of the preceding months, the Aesopian dialectical utterances of the ideologists, the exchange of thinly veiled insults among the leaders, the fantastic lobbying such as the near disruption by the Chinese of the WFTU meeting in Peking (June 1960), the "Dennis the Menace" act of the Albanians, or the flamboyant house-party of Khrushchev and his East European stooges on the Baltica. It is indeed an odd way to "run a railroad," but it is essential for us to bear in mind that it is their way.

That the Conference itself was a momentous gathering cannot be doubted. Never before has there been such an assemblage of Communist leaders. Khrushchev, Liu, and even the absent Mao can hardly have failed to be impressed by the formidable array if not the augustness of the occasion.

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Even the absence of one of the most outstanding brethren, Palmiro Togliatti, must be interpreted as a tribute to its significance.¹

Inevitably, Western analysis has sought for evidence in the outcome that one or the other of the disputants "won." We have noted that this type of "boxscoremanship" has yielded varying results, depending considerably on previously held views, or whether the individual analyst was more of a specialist in Soviet or Chinese affairs. Advance expectations that China would be pressed to "recant" were not borne out. Indeed, there is some evidence that the CPSU, rather than the CPC, indulged in a measure of "self-criticism." Whatever the balance of concession or compromise, the outcome was probably viewed by the assemblage as the achievement of satisfactory consensus, proclaimed as "unanimity." There was no general "victory" by either side, no "triumph" of Khrushchev, and no "loss of face" by Mao.

For us, the significant concern should be with the documents which the Conference produced, the Statement, and to a lesser extent the Propagandistic Appeal. These are there for all to read, as are the encomia, elaborations and glosses which are pouring out in abundance. As a basic counsel of prudence, we would recommend that the Statement be studied

¹ Togliatti is reported to have been unwilling to be associated personally with the outcome which he claims to have foreseen. It is highly doubtful, however, that one of the few surviving stalwarts of the Comintern, the leader of the largest "mass" party outside the Bloc, the spokesman of criticism against the "degeneration" of the CPSU revealed by Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization speech, the author of the theory of "polycentrism," would - like Mao - choose to "sulk in his tent" on such grounds. At any rate, his subsequent authoritative interpretation and praise of the Statement suggest that he is not "out of line."

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and re-studied carefully and clinically by all persons in authority throughout the Free World. It is not a prelude to a "hot war"; it certainly is no assurance of peace in our sense; it pledges only "peaceful coexistence" which, by precise Communist definition, is the highest order of class struggle. Hence, it can only be regarded as a commitment to indefinite continuance of "cold war," punctuated by blackmailing threats of violence, and at least risk of limited "just" wars in situations of "liberation from imperialism and colonialism."

The formidable threatening tone of the Statement, especially its clear designation of the United States, "heading the imperialist camp," as the main enemy, has not escaped the notice of the West. Nevertheless, in the face of countervailing blandishments, conciliatory gestures, hints of promising negotiation, the West continues to be bemused. Perhaps, it hopes, the USSR is really groping toward a full settlement, spurred on by alarm over Communist China.

It is natural that Western analysis should continue, under its earlier momentum, to scrutinize Chinese and Soviet follow-up for evidence of persistent divergence. But it would seem unwise to try to prove that the earlier analysis was right on all points, that nothing has changed, that the "rift" must surely be greater than ever.

Rather we suggest that the analysis proceed from the assumption that "something new has been added." This something new is the public acceptance by the CPSU of the end of "monocentrism." Whether the appropriate new formula would be "duocentrism," "polycentrism" or "acentrism" remains to be seen. Under whatever formula the movement is now viewed, it clearly covers the entire world. And the USSR, like the US, has long since been made aware that the world is in a flux of history, so complex and mighty that traditional patterns of authority and techniques of power are swept before it.

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Just as the US is seeing and accepting the rapid modification of its position as "leader of the Free World," so the USSR has been adjusting itself to the exigencies imposed upon it by shifts in political alignment of the old and the new world order. The two chief foci of global polarization are alike compelled to recognize the hard fact that the greater and the lesser nations stand on a footing of equality when it comes to voting, whether in the United Nations or in the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties.

Khrushchev appears to have adjusted himself to the reality of this new dispensation. He affirmed the basic equality of all Communist parties in his speech at the 21st CPSU Congress and repeated it with heightened emphasis a year later (6 January 1961):

From the tribune of the Congress we declared before the whole world that in the communist movement, just as in the socialist camp, there has existed and exists complete equality of rights and solidarity of all communist and workers parties and socialist countries. The CPSU in reality does not exercise leadership over other parties. In the communist movement there are no parties that are superior or subordinate. All communist parties are equal and independent. (FBIS, Daily Report Supplement, USSR and East Europe, No. 1, p. 44).

This pious profession will of course be viewed in the West with understandable skepticism. It is already being stated that the Moscow Conference was in fact the Eighth Meeting of the Communist International (the Seventh was in 1935).¹ By this interpretation, Moscow would have in effect

¹ Cf. Branko Lazitch, Est & Ouest, No. 249-250, January 1961.

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restored its primacy in the world movement, and the lesser parties would be bound to the writ of the CPSU as in the past, subject to accommodation with a new and growing rival, the Chinese Party. Such an interpretation gains color from the emphasis in both Moscow and Peking on the fact that their two parties are of course still the "biggest," and have a special role in the movement.

Nevertheless, even making allowances for the persistence of established patterns of dependence, and for the massive, if intangible influence which the "senior brothers" can continue to exert, the fact remains that the juniors have been admitted to a new role in the governance of the "big family." The scores of delegates who spoke their pieces and listened throughout the month of November were acknowledged as partners. The tight 12 nation nucleus of the "world socialist system" stands poised for a vast drive toward universality. In the global diversity of International Communism, the mightiest and the least are indeed in a real sense collectively co-equal, and it is no longer sufficient for the West to speak meaningfully of one or two being "more equal" than the rest.

We do not state that the sodruzhestvo has fully materialized. Much time and effort must still be spent by the communists in determining what they actually achieved in November 1960, and where they must direct their main effort of "construction." The World Marxist Review (organized in Prague in 1957) marked a step in the coordination of ideology and tactics among parties. The Chinese at Moscow protested plaintively over the fact that for a year they had been excluded from its pages; it will be interesting to note whether this ostracism is permanently lifted as a result of the conference. The Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) is being gradually transformed into a potent instrument of economic coordination and integration; here, too, a new role for Communist China - hitherto only an "observer" - may emerge. Military cooperation, a sore point at the Moscow Conference,

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may enter a more harmonious phase, and the enigma - to us at least - of China's prospects in the nuclear warfare field may be clarified. Scientific cooperation in the "world socialist system" has not, so far as we know, been interrupted by the controversy on other matters. In the drive for a universal application of cybernetics, especially to the conditioning of the new "communist man," China and the USSR have every interest in common endeavor. The joint nuclear research program (Dubna) and other areas of burgeoning science may be expanded as the new "scientific city" of Novosibirsk begins to function.

In short, goals, objectives, interests, convictions and even habit all seem to prescribe a closing of ranks and a pulling together of strategy and tactics. How this process can be carried out in the intervals between multilateral meetings remains to be seen. There has been, and will continue to be, both pressure for, and resistance to the creation of some form of standing mechanism for coordination within the movement. The chief consequence of the demonstration of contradiction and "comradely criticism" in Moscow may prove to be a consensus among the parties in favor of developing organizational means to guide the movement under the new program, to enforce discipline, and to protect the unity which is "the apple of its eye."

Conclusion

We have attempted to establish the thesis that the Moscow Declaration, as the end product of a prolonged phase of inner contradiction, constitutes a new program for International Communism, correcting the damage to its unity and ushering in a new phase of heightened offensive against the "capitalist-imperialist system." The weapons of this program are dialectic in nature, i.e. strategic and tactical, "hard" and "soft," long and short range, universal and particular. The "inevitability of war" is averted by the "favorable shift" in the

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world balance of power, yet war can still be unleashed by the frantic "imperialists." "Peaceful coexistence" is identified as a heightened form of "class struggle"; it is either a tactic or a strategy, depending on circumstances. The Number One enemy, the United States, has been pilloried, yet it is declared possible to negotiate with him. Disarmament is either a manipulative slogan or a realizable ideal. Massive support of "national liberation" and the authentication of a new form of intermediate state, "national democracy," are powerful means for hastening the ineluctable historic disintegration of "imperialism," but the goal is the rapid creation of conditions for the assumption of power by the "proletariat" and its communist "vanguard." "Peaceful transition to socialism" is possible, and so is its opposite. "Broad united democratic fronts" are an instrument of progress but only if they yield to the advanced leadership of true Marxist-Leninist parties. In backward countries, the "national bourgeoisie" is a legitimate, if temporary partner, and the "imperialist, compradore" bourgeoisie remains the enemy. In advanced countries "monopolies" are the primary target of working class "struggle."

But, whatever the variations in method and tempo, revolution is the essence of the movement. Its progress will not be constant or uniform, and its leadership and its center are indeterminate, but not, eo ipso, without objective existence. Differences will remain in the movement; as Chou En-lai said to Edgar Snow, it would be strange if they did not. These may become contradictions, for despite some latent dispute among Communists, the doctrine of Mao is authoritative: contradictions are the law of life, and they will exist universally even after the triumph of socialism.

But Mao also declares that contradictions cannot become antagonistic within the domain of the Marxist-Leninist parties so long as they are true to themselves. These bodies, steeled in action and guided by scientific doctrine and method, have

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the ability to resolve all contradictions within and among themselves on a non-antagonistic basis. This process, the unity and conflict of opposites, Mao affirms, and Communists generally believe, is the dynamic force of history and of "life itself."

We do not have to believe that Mao's doctrine - it is derived from Lenin and Stalin - is objectively valid. Nor are its world-conquering potentialities certain of actualization. It is not necessary for the Free World to think and plan and act dialectically - it could not, even if it would - but it must recognize that the Communists do; therein lies the main weapon of their choice. On the principle "know your enemy," it would be wise for us to attempt a "voluntary suspension of disbelief" in its reality as a threat.